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IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AS TO
WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD
FOLLOW CANADA’S LEAD AND ALLOW
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

INTRODUCTION

I

n June 2003, the Ontario Court of Appeals handed down
the landmark decision of Halpern v. Toronto, which sanctioned same-sex marriage.1 A mere two months after the decision, nearly 600 same-sex couples had applied for marriage licenses in Toronto’s city hall.2 More than one hundred of these
couples were U.S citizens, who had traveled to Canada to legally marry.3 Not only did the Halpern court rule that the Canadian federal law limiting marriage to heterosexual couples
violated the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the
Canadian Constitution,4 but the court also changed Canada’s
legal definition of marriage to encompass same-sex unions.5
Prior to Canada’s allowance of same-sex marriage it had been

1. Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161.
2. Clifford Krauss, Now Free to Marry, Canada’s Gays Say, ‘Do I?’, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, at A1.
3. Id. Canada has no residency or citizenship requirement for marriage;
therefore, U.S. citizens can obtain a marriage license and legally marry their
same-sex or opposite-sex partner. Deborah Gutierrez, Gay Marriage in Canada: Strategies of the Gay Liberation Movement and the Implications it Will
Have on the United States, 10 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 175, 208 (2004).
Five weeks after Halpern, 15% of the 362 same-sex marriage licenses issued
in Canada were issued to U.S. couples. Jay Weiser, The Next Normal Developments Since Marriage Rights for Same-Sex Couples in New York, 13 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 48, 50 (2004).
4. CAN CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms). Jeffery Hodgson & Randall Palmer, Toronto Issues Gay Marriage License After Ruling, REUTERS, June 10, 2003, available at
http://www.reuters.com/printerFriendlyPopup.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=
2907895.
5. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 196–97.
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legal in the Netherlands since April 2001, in Switzerland since
September 2002, and in Belgium since early 2003.6
In stark contrast to the recent developments in Canada and
Western Europe, the United States lags far behind in recognizing the right of homosexuals to marry.7 The reason why the
U.S. couples had to cross the border to marry is that only one of
the fifty states permits same-sex couples to legally marry.8
While Senators in the United States are working to amend the
Constitution to say that marriage can only be between one man
6. Developments in the Law: II. Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths
Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and
Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004 (2003); Weiser, supra note 3, at 50.
7. Steve Sanders, U.S. Lags on Gay Rights; Supreme Court Can Help,
CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2003, at C3.
8. See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (holding that the prohibition on same-sex marriage violated
Massachusetts’ constitution). See also Massachusetts Court Rules Ban on Gay
Marriage Unconstitutional, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/18/
samesex.marriage.ruling/.
Six months after gay and lesbian couples began legally marrying in
Massachusetts, opponents of same-sex marriage swept Election Day,
with voters in eleven states approving constitutional amendments
codifying marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution. The
amendments won in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah and even Oregon – the one state where gay rights activists had hoped to prevail.
The amendments passed with a 3-to-1 margin in Kentucky, Georgia
and Arkansas, 3-to-2 in Ohio and 6-to-1 in Mississippi. Bans passed
by narrower margins in Oregon, about 57%, and Michigan, about
59%.
Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown On Gay Marriage Laws, Nov. 3, 2004,
available at http://www.stateline.org/stateline/?pa=story&sa=showStoryInfo&
id=353058&columns=false.
Since Massachusetts began allowing gay and lesbian couples to wed
last May, 13 states have approved constitutional bans on same-sex
marriage. This number includes Missouri, which approved such a
measure in August. The amendments in Mississippi, Montana and
Oregon refer only to marriage, specifying that it should be limited to
unions of one man and one woman. The measures in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Utah
call for a ban on civil unions or other partnership benefits as well. …
Since the Massachusetts ruling, more than 35 states have introduced
legislation aimed at preserving the traditional definition of marriage
as a union between a man and a woman.
Id.
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and one woman,9 the Canadian courts are ruling that the same
declaration in their country is unconstitutional.10 Furthermore,
in 1996, the U.S. federal government enacted the Defense Of
Marriage Act (DOMA),11 which established that no state has an
obligation to recognize a same-sex union performed in another
state.12 DOMA also codified the federal definition of marriage
as the union of one man and one woman.13 In addition to the
9. Helen Dewar & Alan Cooperman, Gay Marriage Ban Headed for Senate Defeat; GOP May Salvage Rural Voters' Goodwill Out of Failure to Amend
Constitution, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, at A2.
10. Janice Tibbetts, MPS Want Quick Vote on Same-Sex Marriage, THE
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://canada.com/national/
story.asp?id=887A9FC7-D85D-4BC0-A8D2-E199736A900D. Courts in three
provinces – Toronto, British Columbia, and Quebec – have said that the federal ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional and currently Toronto and
British Columbia permit same-sex marriages. All other provinces are waiting
for federal legislation to pass before allowing same-sex unions. Id.
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(C) (2005), which provides that
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, or tribe, or a right
or claim arising from such relationship.
Id.
The federal government’s DOMA is not an outright ban on same-sex
marriage, but it does allow the federal and state governments to refuse to
recognize same-sex unions. Maria Hinojosa, Massachusetts Court to Rule on
Same-Sex Marriages, Jan. 13, 2004, available at http:www.cnn.com/2003/LAW
/07/14/same.sex.marriages/.
12. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(C).
13. 1 U.S.C.S. § 7 (2005), which provides that:
[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus
and agencies or the United States, the word “marriage” means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who
is a husband or wife.
Id.
See also Elizabeth Kristen, Recent Developments: The Struggle for Same-Sex
Marriage Continues, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 104, 113 (1999).
With the enactment of DOMA, Congress for the first time limited
States’ obligation to give full faith and credit to ‘public acts, records
and judicial proceedings’ of other states. Some commentators have
argued that DOMA is unconstitutional since it exceeds Congress’s
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federal DOMA, thirty-nine states have enacted “junior DOMAs”, which essentially provide for the same rules as their federal counterpart.14
While the Canadian government did not pass a specific marriage law establishing the rights of gay and lesbian couples to
marry, the court, of its own accord, determined that prohibiting
same-sex unions was in violation of the Canadian Constitution.15 If changes regarding same-sex marriage are to be made
in the United States, they will likely follow a similar path, as it
seems probable that any changes, if and when they come, will
come through the courts, rather than through the legislature.
This Note seeks to establish that the U.S. Supreme Court
should raise the level of judicial review afforded to sexual orientation for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.16 Once the
Court makes this change, it should reach the same conclusion
as the Ontario Court of Appeals did in Halpern because Canada’s mode of constitutional analysis is similar to U.S. analysis
of equal protection under an intermediate level of scrutiny. Although Halpern is analogous to the U.S. judicial review standard of intermediate scrutiny, the Halpern court’s analysis of
the arguments given by the Attorney General would yield the
same result under a rational review standard.
In Part I, this Note examines Canadian case law leading up
to Halpern with an emphasis on how judicial opinion regarding
homosexuality and equality has evolved since the Charter’s inception. Part II focuses on the reasoning used by the Ontario
Court of Appeals in declaring that prohibiting same-sex marpowers and violates equal protection. The constitutionality of DOMA
cannot be challenged, however, until a same-sex couple’s marriage,
valid in one state, is denied recognition in another.
Id.
14. DOMA Watch, available at http://www.domawatch.org/index.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2005). The eleven states that do not have junior DOMA’s are
the following: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Peterson, supra note 8. But it should be noted that in New Hampshire and Wyoming there is a state law that bans same-sex marriage and predates DOMA laws; and in Wisconsin there has been a state Supreme Court
ruling stating that only heterosexual marriages are legal. Id.
15. See generally Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161 (holding that the prohibition on
same-sex marriage violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
16. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
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riages violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and promoted principles “that are not justified in a free and
democratic society” and how the court was able to reach its conclusion.17 Part III examines how the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, with a
particular focus on case law regarding sexual orientation. Part
IV discusses how the analysis used by the Canadian courts
compares to that used by U.S. courts, and why U.S. courts
should apply heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation, as the Canadian courts do. Part
V shows that the Canadian court’s analysis is also applicable to
the rational review test, so that under the rational review test
the U.S. courts should determine that a ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. Finally, Part VI shows that regardless of what standard of review the U.S. Supreme Court uses, it
will be able to reach the same conclusion as Halpern.
Traditionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has not looked to the
decisions of other countries in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, and this Note does not propose that it do so.18 Instead, this
Note proposes that if the U.S. Supreme Court affords sexual
orientation the heightened level of scrutiny that it deserves, the
court must draw the same conclusions as the Halpern court because the constitutional analysis is analogous.

17. See generally Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161 (holding that the prohibition on
same-sex marriage violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
18. Cody Moon, Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the United
States Supreme Court Join the Dialogue? 12 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 229, 240
(2003).
However, evidence of the U.S. Supreme Court looking to foreign courts
can be found in Lawrence v. Texas where the court stated,
[T]o the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers
have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights
has not followed Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom. Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct. The right petitioners seek in this case
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many
other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the
government interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow
more legitimate or urgent.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
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I. HISTORY OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HALPERN
The court’s decision in Halpern was monumental, but it was
only able to reach its conclusion by looking back to prior decisions regarding sexual orientation and the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. The Charter, which was adopted in 1982, is the
Canadian Bill of Rights and it forms part of the Constitution of
Canada.19 The purpose of the Charter is to ensure that the government respects the individual rights and freedoms of Canadian citizens.20 Challenges to laws regarding the rights and
freedoms of homosexuals are often analyzed under Section 15(1)
and Section 1 of the Charter.21 Section 15(1) states that “Every
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”22 Section 1 states that “The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it are subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”23 If a law is challenged as being discriminatory under Section 15(1) of the Charter, the court must first determine whether the law actually is discriminating against a
particular individual or group of people.24 If the law is found to
be discriminatory the court then turns to Section 1 and determines whether the discrimination imposed by the law can be
justified by a legitimate state interest.25
Challenges regarding gay rights based on Section 15(1) and
Section 1 of Charter of Rights and Freedoms began shortly after

19. Gutierrez, supra note 3, at 180 (The Charter applies to all federal and
provisional levels of government and guarantees a set of civil liberties and
fundamental rights that are protected from the actions of Parliament, provincial legislatures, government agencies and officials.).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161.
22. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), §15.
23. CAN. CONST (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), §1.
24. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179.
25. Id. at 190–91. See Part II for a more thorough discussion of Section
15(1) and Section 1 of the Charter.
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the Charter’s inception in 1982.26 Some of the earliest Charter
cases involving same-sex discrimination were heard by appellate courts. The first case worthy of note is Andrews v. Ontario
(Minister of Health) for its use of a biological argument in supporting discrimination against homosexuals.27 In Andrews, the
court ruled that the Ontario Health Insurance Program did not
violate Section 15(1) of the Charter by excluding same-sex couples and their children from the program.28 The court did not
find a violation because it determined that, since heterosexual
couples could marry, procreate, and raise children and same-sex
couples could not, there are biological differences between the
two groups.29 This “difference” allowed the court to determine
that same-sex couples were not entitled to formal equality with
heterosexual couples.30 The approach of heteronormativity articulated in Andrews reverberated in subsequent cases.31
One such case is Layland v. Ontario.32 In reaching its decision that same-sex couples were not legally entitled to marry,
the court relied on the common law definition of marriage and
what the court determined was the principle purpose of mar26. Brenda Cossman, Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 223, 225 (2002). Prior to the
inception of the Charter another significant victory in the battle for equality
for gays and lesbians occurred in 1969 when Parliament decriminalized sodomy. R. Douglas Elliot, The Canadian Earthquake: Same-Sex Marriage in
Canada, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 591, 620 (2004). “This particular revision to the
Federal Criminal Code, applied across the nation and was justified on the
grounds that the State had no business in the ‘bedrooms of the nations’ and
‘what’s done in private between adults.’” Jane Adolphe, The Case Against
Same-Sex Marriage in Canada: Law and Policy Considerations. 18 BYU J.
PUB. L. 479, 487 (2004).
In contrast, the United States did not decriminalize sodomy until 2003
in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court had to overturn a 1986 case which
upheld the criminalization of sodomy. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 1039 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
27. See generally Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health), [1988] 64
O.R.2d 258 (holding that the Ontario Health Insurance Program did not violate Section 15(1) of the Charter by excluding same-sex couples and their children from the program).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 21.
30. Id. at 38.
31. Cossman, supra note 26, at 225.
32. See generally Layland v. Ontario, [1993] 104 D.L.R. 214 (holding that
same-sex couples were not legally entitled to marry).
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riage – procreation.33 Procreation, the court wrote, cannot be
achieved in same-sex unions “because of the biological limitations of such a union.”34 Although the court found that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violated Section
15(1) of the Charter, given that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation was analogous to discrimination against any
of the classes specifically referenced in Section 15(1) of the
Charter, it did not find any discrimination in the prohibition
against same-sex unions.35
It was however, Justice Greer’s dissent in Layland that, a
decade later, the majority in Halpern would echo. Greer believed that it was not sufficient to simply look at the preCharter cases to determine the definition of marriage.36 Instead, the concept needed to be placed “in the larger social context of our modern-day society and its mores and expectations.”37 He went on to say that “choice” is a benefit of the law
and a fundamental right which applies to marriage.38 Under
Section 15(1), the right to choose is protected.39 Section 15(1) is
also designed to protect those who are disadvantaged in society,
and traditionally homosexuals have been subjected to discrimination.40 In addition to finding a violation under Section 15(1),
33. Id. at 219–23. The court determined that the petitioners tried to use
Section 15 of the Charter to alter the common law definition of marriage and
the Charter does not serve that function. Id. at 223. Furthermore, the definition does not constitute a violation of Section 15. Id. A homosexual person is
entitled to marry; he or she can marry someone of the opposite sex. Id.
34. Id. at 223. The court did note that although not every heterosexual
marriage produces children, the institution of marriage is intended by the
state, religions, and society to encourage procreation. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 228 (Greer, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 229.
40. Id.
The historic disadvantage suffered by homosexual persons has been
widely recognized and documented. Public harassment and verbal
abuse of homosexual individuals is not uncommon. Homosexual
women and men have been the victims of crimes and violence directed at them specifically because of their sexual orientation. …
They have been discriminated against in their employment and their
access to services. They have been excluded from some aspects of
public life solely because of their sexual orientation. … The stigmati-
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Greer concluded that the law could not be saved by Section 1,
because the government was not able to prove that the discrimination imposed by the law was justified.41
The first Charter case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada
involving the issue of sexual orientation and equality was Egan
v. Canada (A.G).42 In Egan, a homosexual couple challenged the
definition of “spouse” as it appeared in the Old Age Security
Act, claiming that the definition violated Section 15(1) of the
Charter.43 The court unanimously held that even though sexual
orientation was not explicitly listed in Section 15(1) of the Charter, it was analogous to those classes that are enumerated in
zation of homosexual persons and the hatred which some members of
the public have expressed towards them has forced many homosexual
persons to conceal their orientation. This imposes its own associated
costs in the workplace, the community and in private life.
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 184 (quoting Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 60002).
41. Layland, 104 D.L.R. at 233 (Greer, J., dissenting).
Justice Greer
stated that while it is in the interest of the state to protect family relationships, this interest should apply equally to both same-sex and heterosexual
unions. Id. It is discriminatory to say that the state only needs to preserve
heterosexual families, and a rule with a discriminatory purpose is not justified
under Section 1. Id.
42. See generally Egan, 2 S.C.R. 513 (holding that the Old Age Security Act
was constitutional because although declining benefits based on sexual orientation was discriminatory under Section 15(1) of the Charter, the government
established sufficient reasons for why the law was justified under Section 1).
The first case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada involving gay equality
rights was Mossop v. Canada, in which a gay man was denied the right by his
employer to receive bereavement leave when his partner’s father died. Mossop v. Canada (A.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 construed in Cossman, supra note
26, at 226–27. The petitioner, however, did not challenge on Charter grounds.
Id. Instead, the petitioner claimed he was being discriminated against under
the Human Rights Act on the basis of family status and not sexual orientation. Id. The Supreme Court dismissed the case stating that the denial was
based on sexual orientation and not family status. Id. Since the petitioner
did not raise any constitutional challenges there was no basis for his claim.
Id.
43. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 527. “Spouse” is defined in 19(1) of the Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985, which states that “spouse, in relation to any person,
includes a person of the opposite sex who is living with that person, having
lived with that person for a least one year, if the two persons have publicly
represented themselves as husband and wife. …” Id. This definition extends
to common law relationships. Id. The appellants claim that the definition is a
violation of Section 15 of the Charter in that it discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation. Id. at 527–28.
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this section and, therefore, discrimination based on sexual orientation was prohibited.44 Then, in reaching the conclusion that
Section 1 permits the discrimination, the court determined that
it was sound public policy for Parliament to favor and provide
support for heterosexual married couples.45 Marriage, the court
said, is “deeply rooted in our fundamental values and traditions, values and traditions that could not have been lost on the
framers of the Charter.”46
The Egan court then turned to the biological argument, that
marriage is by nature heterosexual and grounded in the biological and social realities that only heterosexual couples can procreate.47 Due to the important position marriage holds in society and the unique needs of the union, the court held that Parliament is permitted to afford it special support and, therefore,
the discrimination based on sexual orientation was found to be
reasonable under Section 1.48
Just five years after Egan, the Supreme Court ruled in
Vriend v. Alberta that the denial of formal equality to homosexuals was a violation of Section 15(1) and could not qualify as
an exception under Section 1.49 In Vriend, a science laboratory
coordinator was fired from his job at a Christian college because
he was gay.50 While Vriend was not about same-sex marriage, it
was a sign of the future: no longer would discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation survive a Charter challenge.51
In the next case to reach the Supreme Court, M. v. H., the
court declared the term “spouse,” as it appeared in the Family
Law Act (FLA),52 a violation of the Charter.53 The court held

44. Id. at 528.
45. Id. at 536–37.
46. Id. at 535.
47. Id. at 536.
48. Id. See also Cossman, supra note 26, at 229.
49. See generally Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (holding that a law
cannot deny formal equality to homosexuals).
50. Id.
51. Cossman, supra note 26, at 232.
52. Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 29 (1990) (Can.) (The Family Law
Act provides a means for a person to petition the court to receive support from
a spouse, or a man or woman with whom a person lived with in an oppositesex conjugal relationship.).
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that the definition encompassed only opposite-sex couples and,
as such, was a violation of Section 15(1) because it discriminated entirely on the basis of sexual orientation.54 In reaching
this conclusion, the court determined that the denial of the potential benefit gained from spousal support may create an economic burden that would contribute to the “general vulnerability by individuals in same-sex relationships.”55 The court held
that when analyzing a benefit under Section 15(1), it must look
beyond whether a party is conferred a benefit and examine
whether he or she is denied access to a process that can give an
economic or non-economic benefit.56 Moreover, there is a societal significance to receiving benefits under the FLA. By excluding same-sex couples, the legislature was essentially stating
that these relationships are less worthy of recognition and protection and are not able to create the intimate relationships
that derive from economic interdependence.57
Under the Section 1 analysis, the court determined that the
government did not meet its burden, which is to prove that the
discrimination imposed by the law is justified.58 To meet this
burden, the legislature has to provide the court with evidence to
support its claim and justification.59 The court concluded that
53. See generally M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (holding that the definition of
spouse at it appeared in the Family Law Act was a violation of Section 15(1)
because it discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation).
54. Id. at 57.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Id. at 60.
57. Id. at 62.
58. Id. at 63.
59. Id.
In carrying out their duties, courts are not to second-guess legislatures and the executives; they are not to make value judgments on
what they regard as the proper policy choice; this is for the other
branches. Rather, the courts are to uphold the Constitution. … This
court has often stressed the importance of deference to the policy
choices of the legislature in the context of determining whether the
legislature has discharged its burden of proof under Section 1 of the
Charter. … Deference is not a kind of threshold inquiry under Section
1. As a general matter, the role of the legislature demands deference
from the courts to those types of policy decisions that the legislature
is best placed to make. The simple or general claim that the infringement of a right is justified under Section 1 is not such a decision. The notion of judicial deference to legislative choices should
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the exclusion of same-sex couples was not rationally related to
the government’s objective under the FLA.60 The court noted
that the objective of the FLA was to alleviate the financial burden on a spouse when a relationship dissolved and that the objective would actually be enhanced if it included same-sex couples under the FLA.61
It should be noted that the court specifically announced that
it was not making any statement regarding same-sex marriage
or on any related issues.62 Because the FLA applied to both
married and unmarried opposite-sex couples, the court was only
able to determine whether the FLA discriminated against samesex couples who were cohabitating in ways equivalent to cohabitating opposite-sex couples.63
Although the court did not make any determination with regard to same-sex marriage, it did recognize that same-sex relationships are legitimate and entitled to legal protection.64 Furthermore, the aftermath of the decision had other far reaching
consequences. The Ontario government amended sixty-seven
statutes that included the term “spouse” to include same-sex
partners in An Act to Amend Certain Statutes Because of the
Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H.65 However, the
Ontario government made these changes reluctantly. Prime
Minister Mike Harris stated “[t]his legislation is not part of
our…agenda. We are introducing this bill because of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision.”66 Moreover, the legislature
responded in a way the Supreme Court had not intended.67 Instead of creating a gender-neutral definition of the word
not…be used to completely immunize certain kinds of legislative decisions from Charter scrutiny.
Id. at 59–60.
60. Id. at 69.
61. Id. at 73.
62. Id. at 58.
63. Id. The court determined that same-sex couples are capable of forming
conjugal relationships, even though they cannot “hold themselves out” as husband and wife. Id. at 51.
64. See generally M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 construed in Cossman, supra note 26,
at 235.
65. Id.
66. Jason Murphy, Dialogic Responses to M. v. H.: From Compliance to
Defiance, 59 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 299, 305 (2001).
67. Id.
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“spouse,” the government established a new category of relationship by calling it “same-sex partner,” thereby creating a
separate but equal approach.68
The federal government responded to M. v. H. by approving a
motion stating that “it is necessary to state that marriage is
and should remain the union of one man and one woman to the
exclusion of all others,” and that Parliament “will take all necessary steps within its jurisdiction to preserve this definition of
marriage in Canada.”69 Although this motion was only symbolic as it had no legal force, its symbolism was important because it reflected the federal government’s opposition to samesex marriages.70
By the time M. v. H. was decided, it appeared that the Supreme Court of Canada had moved away from the biological
argument used to deny equality based on sexual orientation,
and towards recognizing equality for same-sex couples. However, it is equally as clear that the elected government had not.

The specific amendment to s. 29 of the FLA in that act inserted the
following definition alongside that of "spouse": 'same-sex partner'
means either of two persons of the same sex who have cohabited,
(a) continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
(b) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or
adoptive parents of a child.
Id. at n. 27.
68
Id. at 306.
This separate but equal approach clashed dramatically with the position held by same-sex rights activists that the order in M. v. H. required legislatures to include both opposite-sex and same-sex couples
within a single definition of spouse. To do otherwise, they argued,
went against the very spirit of the decision by affixing separate labels
on the basis of sexual orientation.
Id.
69. Cossman, supra note 26, at 237. The federal government created the
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act. Murphy, supra note 66, at
305.
70. Cossman, supra note 26, at 237. While other provinces responded to
the Supreme Court’s decision, only the responses of Ontario and the Federal
Government bear directly on this note. The U.S. federal government announced its views on marriage with DOMA and, like Canada’s government
after M. v. H,, the United States is against same-sex unions. Anti Gay Marriage Act Clears Congress, CNN, Sept. 10, 1996, available at http://
www.cnn.com/US/9609/10/gay.marriage/. Unlike Canada however, DOMA is
not symbolic, but federal law. 28 U.S.C.A § 1738(C).
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HALPERN V. TORONTO71

In Canada, as well as other jurisdictions around the world,
same-sex marriage has been the subject of legal, political, and
moral debate.72 In increments, the Supreme Court of Canada
has extended certain benefits and rights to gays and lesbians.
It was, therefore, only a matter of time before a challenge to the

71. As of this publication, Halpern has not been appealed and the federal
government announced that it would not appeal the decision. Elliot, supra
note 26, at 613–14. Instead, on July 16, 2003, the legislature referred a draft
Bill entitled Proposal for an Act Respecting Certain Aspects of Legal Capacity
for Marriage for Civil Purposes (“Proposed Act”) to the Canadian Supreme
Court for an advisory opinion. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 Can.
Sup. Ct. LEXIS 76 *16. The Court was to determine the validity of the act.
Id. The relevant sections are as follows: Section 1: Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others; Section
2: Nothing in this Act affects the freedom of officials of religious groups to
refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious
beliefs. Id. (construing Proposal for an Act Respecting Certain Aspects of Legal Capacity for Marriage for Civil Purposes (“Proposed Act”)).
Three questions were presented to the Canadian Supreme Court to
determine the validity of the act. The three questions were as follows:
1. Is the annexed Proposal for an Act Respecting Certain Aspects of
Legal Capacity for Marriage for Civil Purposes within the exclusive
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada? 2. If the answer
to question 1 is yes, is section 1 of the proposal, which extends capacity to marry to persons of the same sex, consistent with the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 3. Does the freedom of religion
guaranteed by paragraph 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms protect religious official from being compelled to perform a
marriage between two persons of the same sex that is contrary to
their religious beliefs.
Id. at *17
In answering these questions, the Supreme Court determined that
Section 1 of the Proposed Act is within the exclusive legislative competence of
Parliament, while Section 2 is not. Id. Furthermore, the new definition of
marriage is constitutional, and religious officials cannot be compelled to perform marriages contrary to their religious beliefs. Id.
After the decision by the court, the Bill will then be submitted to Parliament
for a vote. Elliot, supra note 26, at 613–14. However, the legal definition of
marriage has already been changed. Id.
72. Mark D. Walters, Incorporating Common Law Into the Constitution of
Canada: EGALE v. Canada and the Status of Marriage, 41 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 75, 78 (2003).
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refusal to allow same-sex marriages appeared before the Canadian courts.73
A. Facts of Halpern v. Toronto
The lawsuit began over three years ago when seven same-sex
couples (Couples) applied for civil marriage licenses from the
Clerk of the City of Toronto.74 Instead of denying the licenses,
the clerk stated that she would hold them in abeyance while
waiting for directions from the courts.75 The Couples decided
not to wait on the clerk and, instead, commenced their own application.76 On August 22, 2000, the Couples’ application was
transferred to the Divisional Court.77
At about the same time that the Couples began their application, the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto (MCCT)
decided it would marry homosexual couples in religious ceremonies.78 The reason for this decision was MCCT’s learning
that under the application of the laws of Ontario, the ancient
Christian tradition of publishing the banns79 of marriage was a
lawful alternative to a marriage license issued by municipal
authorities.80 Two same-sex couples decided to marry at MCCT
73. In addition to Halpern, there were two other Canadian courts that
sanctioned same-sex marriages. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 173. In Quebec, in
Hendricks v. Quebec (Attorney General) the court “declared invalid the prohibition against same- sex marriages caused by the intersection of two federal
statutes and the Civil Code of Quebec on the basis that it contravened Section
15 (1) of the Charter and could not be saved under Section 1.” Id. (quoting
Hendricks v. Quebec, [2002] R.J.Q. 2506). The declaration was stayed for two
years to allow the legislature to respond. Id.
In British Columbia, in EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court of Appeals “declared the common law definition of marriage
unconstitutional, substituted the words ‘two persons’ for ‘one man and one
woman’ and suspended the declaration of unconstitutionality until July 12,
2004, the expiration of the two-year suspension ordered by the Divisional
Court in this case.” Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 173 (quoting EGALE v. Canada,
[2003] B.C.J. 994).
74. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 169.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/02255a.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). Banns of marriage is the ecclesiastical announcement of the names of persons contemplating marriage. Id.
80. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 169.
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in a religious ceremony, and thereafter, Reverend Brent
Hawkes published their banns during services.81 Reverend
Hawkes then married the couples, registered the marriages in
the Church register, issued the couples marriage certificates,
and submitted the required documents to the Office of the Registrar General.82
The Registrar refused to accept the documents, stating that the federal prohibition on same-sex marriages prevented him from registering the marriages.83 In response to the registrar’s assertion, MCCT brought an application to the Divisional Court.84
On July 12, 2002, for the first time in Canadian history, a
court found that the common-law rule barring same-sex marriage was unconstitutional.85 The Divisional Court found that
the law was unconstitutional because it violated Section 15(1) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was not
saved by Section 1 of the Charter.86 Although the decision regarding constitutionality was unanimous, the court was divided
as to the appropriate remedy.87 The court, therefore, decided to
suspend the remedy for twenty-four months to allow “Parlia-

81. Id. at 170.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. By an order dated January 25, 2001, the applications of The Couples’ and MCCT were consolidated. Id. On November 5-9, 2001, a threemember panel, Justice LaForme, Justice Blair and Justice Smith, of the Ontario Divisional Court heard the case. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 170 (citing
Halpern v. Toronto, [2002] 60 O.R.3d 321).
85. Kathryn Chapman, Comment, Chronique De Jurisprudence: Halpern v.
Toronto, 19 CAN. J. FAM. L. 423, 425 (2002).
86. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 170.
87. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 170–71.
Smith A.C.J.S.C. was of the view that Parliament should legislate the
appropriate remedy and that it should be given two years to do so,
failing which the parties could return to the court to seek an appropriate remedy. LaForme J. favoured immediate amendment, by the
court, of the common law definition of marriage by substituting the
words “two persons” for “one man and one woman.” Blair R.S.J.
adopted a middle position; he would have allowed Parliament two
years to amend the common law rule, failing which the reformulation
remedy proposed by LaForme J. would be automatically triggered. It
is Blair R.S.J.’s position that is reflected in the formal judgment of
the court.
Id.

File: Allyson MACRO 03.30.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 3/30/2005 2:22 PM

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:16 PM

563

ment to respond to the Charter violation by engaging in debate
with respect to the social, religious, and other values related to
marriage.”88 Before Parliament responded, however, the Attorney General of Canada appealed89 and the Couples and MCCT
cross appealed.90
B. Decision in Halpern v. Toronto
The question on appeal was whether Canada’s definition of
marriage, which excludes same-sex couples from marrying, violates Section 2(a)91 or Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms in a way that cannot be permitted in a
free and democratic society under Section 1 of the Charter.92
The court put forth a detailed analysis, which ultimately led to
its decision that denying same-sex couples the right to marry
violated the Charter.93
The court began by establishing that the definition of marriage is found at common law.94 The definition was first espoused in Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee by Lord Penzance, in
which he stated, “I conceive that marriage, as understood in
Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary
union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all
others.”95 The court determined that the common law definition
88. Chapman, supra note 85, at 425.
89. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 171 (appealed on the equality issue).
90. Id. The couples cross-appealed on the question of remedy alone. Id.
They sought “a declaration of unconstitutionality and a reformulation of the
definition of marriage, both to take place immediately, and related personal
remedies in the nature of mandamus.” Id. MCCT cross-appealed on the question of remedy. Id. In addition, it cross-appealed that the current definition
of marriage infringes its §§ 2(a) and §15(1) rights as a religious institution.
Id.
91. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), §§2(a). Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
states, “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms (a) freedom of conscience and religion.” Id. The court determined that there was no violation of
Section 2(a). Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 171.
92. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 171.
93. See generally Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161 (holding that the prohibition
against same-sex marriage violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
94. Id. at 173.
95. Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee L.R. 1 P&D. 130, 133 (1866). *This
has been the definition of marriage in Canada for all of the nation’s 136 years.
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 166.
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of marriage violated the Couples’ equality rights on the basis of
sexual orientation under Section 15(1) and that this violation
could not be justified under Section 1.96
In addition to the common law definition, the court noted that
the word “marriage” appears in the Constitution Act, raising
the question of whether a constitutional amendment was
needed to change Canada’s definition of marriage.97 The court
decided that an amendment was not needed because “marriage”
did not have a constitutionally-fixed meaning, but was, instead,
a flexible term that could change as Canadian society changed.98
The court did not want to “freeze” the definition of marriage as
to how it was defined in 1867 because that would be contrary to
Canada’s progressive constitutional interpretation.99 The constitution, the court noted, “must be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical
realities often unimagined by its framers.”100 Since the term
“marriage” was flexible there was no need for constitutional
amendment procedures.101 Because a constitutional amendment
was not needed, both the courts and Parliament were free to
alter the law without resorting to the intricacies and difficulties
of the amendment process. After determining that an amendment was not needed, the court went on to discuss whether
prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the Charter.

96. Id. at 196. The court ultimately determined that the common law definition did not infringe freedom of religion rights under §§ 2(a) of the Charter.
Id.
97. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 174 (construing CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act,
1867) §§ 91(26), 92(12)).
The Association for Marriage and Family in Ontario takes the position that the word ‘marriage as used in the Constitution Act, 1867 is
a constitutionally entrenched term that refers to the legal definition
of marriage that existed at Confederation’… that being the ‘union of
one man and one woman.’ As such the definition can only be amended
by formal constitutional amendment procedures.
Id.
98. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 176.
99. Halpern ,65 O.R.3d at 175. The court also noted that “[t]he British
North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and
expansion within its natural limits.” Id. at 175 (quoting Edwards v. A.G. Canada [1930] A.C. 124, 136).
100. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 175.
101. Id. at 176.
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1. Section 15(1) of the Charter
As stated above, Section 15(1) provides that “every individual
is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.”102 Not every distinction created by the legislature, however, is discriminatory.103 A Section 15(1) violation is
found only when the law in question conflicts with the purpose
of Section 15(1).104 The purpose of Section 15(1) is
to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantaging, stereotyping,
or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in
which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and
105
equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.

To determine whether a conflict exists under Section 15(1),
the Supreme Court in Law v. Canada created a three-stage inquiry:
1. Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position within Canadian society
resulting in substantially differential treatment between the
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics?
2. Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on
one or more enumerated and analogous grounds?
3. Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a
burden upon or withholding a benefit for the claimant in a
manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise
has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the
individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a

102. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), §15(1).
103. M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. at 59.
104. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179.
105. Id. (quoting Law v. Canada [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 529).
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human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally de106
serving of concern, respect, and consideration?

Stage 1:
In Stage 1, the court must determine whether the law: a)
draws a formal distinction between the claimant and others on
the basis of one or more personal characteristics; or b) fails to
take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position
within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one
or more personal characteristics.107 Here, the claimant must
decide the relevant group to compare himself or herself to for
the purpose of determining if the claimants are receiving differential treatment.108 In Halpern, the couples determined that the
relevant group was opposite-sex couples, since only opposite-sex
couples have the legal right to marry.109 The Attorney General
argued that, due to the enactment of the Modernization of
Benefits and Obligations Act,110 which gave same-sex couples
substantive equal benefits and protection of the federal law,
same-sex couples do not receive differential treatment.111 The
court disagreed with the Attorney General’s argument and
found that, even with the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, same-sex couples were, in fact, receiving differential

106. Law, 1 S.C.R. at 548–49. The claimant has the burden of establishing
each of these factors on a balance of probabilities. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179.
107. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179.
108. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 180.
109. Id.
110. Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C., ch. 12, §1.(1)
(2000) (Can.).
111. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 180. The government argued that the institution
of marriage does not allow a distinction between opposite-sex and same-sex
couples: “The word marriage is a descriptor of a unique opposite-sex bond that
is common across different times, cultures and religions as a virtually universal norm.” Id. Additionally, the government argued that marriage is not a
common law concept, but instead is a historical and worldwide institution that
predates the Canadian legal framework. Id. Moreover, the definition of marriage is not the source of the differential treatment, the source is the legislation that gives the authority to provide government benefits and obligations.
Id. Since the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act was enacted,
same-sex couples receive substantive equal benefits from the government and
protection of the federal law. Id.
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treatment.112 This determination was founded on the fact that
legislatures give various rights and obligations based on the
institution of marriage, such as licensing and registration, so
that the marriage can be recognized by law.113 Same-sex couples
are denied access to these rights and obligations, and this denial constitutes differential treatment.114 Moreover, the common
law definition of marriage creates a distinction between opposite and same-sex couples on the basis of their sexual orientation. Since a distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex
couples was found, the first stage of the Section 15(1) inquiry
was satisfied.115
Stage 2:
In determining Stage two of the inquiry the court looked to
the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Egan v. Canada.116
Recognizing that although there are specific grounds enumerated in Section 15(1) such as race and religion, the Egan court
determined that sexual orientation was analogous to those already listed in the Charter.117 In Egan, the Supreme Court first
recognized sexual orientation as an analogous ground deserving
of protection when it stated that sexual orientation is a “deeply
personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs.”118 Since the Supreme
Court had previously determined that sexual orientation was
an analogous ground, Stage two was met.119

112. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 180–81.
113. Id. at 181.
114. Id. (“Once the state does provide a benefit it is obliged to do so in a nondiscriminatory manner. …In many circumstances, this will require governments to take positive action, for example by extending the scope of a benefit
to a previously excluded class of persons.”).
115. Id.
116. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 182. See generally Egan, 2 S.C.R. 513 (holding
that sexual orientation is analogous to the specific grounds already listed in
Section 15(1) of the Charter).
117. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.
118. Id.
119. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 183.
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Stage 3:
For the third stage of the inquiry, the court focused on substantive equality, not formal equality, with the emphasis on
human dignity.120 Here, the court was required to consider the
individual’s or group’s traits, history, and circumstances to
evaluate whether a reasonable person in similar circumstances
would find that the law in question differentiates the couples in
a way that demeans their dignity.121 The court also examined
the purpose and effect of the law.122 A law that has a discriminatory purpose cannot survive Section15(1) scrutiny. However,
in order to successfully challenge the law, the claimant does not
have to show a discriminatory purpose; a discriminatory effect
will suffice.123
To determine if a law has a discriminatory purpose or effect,
the court examines four factors.124 These four factors are 1) preexisting disadvantage, stereotyping or vulnerability of the
claimants; 2) correspondence between the grounds and the
120. Id.
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect
and self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon the personal traits or circumstances which do
not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by
laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are
marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups within Canadian
society. Human dignity within the meaning of the equality guarantee does not relate to the status of position of an individual in society
per se, but rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law. Does the law
treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances
regarding the individuals affected and excluded by the law?
Id. (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 530).
121. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 183.
122. Id. at 183.
123. Id. (“[A]ny demonstration by a claimant that a legislative provision or
other state action has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that
the individual is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society…will suffice to establish an
infringement of Section 15(1).”).
124. Id.
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claimant’s actual needs, capacities or circumstances; 3) ameliorative purpose or effects on more disadvantaged individuals or
groups in society; and 4) nature of the interest affected.125 All
four factors do not have to be met for the court to determine
that a law is discriminatory.126
While not dispositive, the first factor is “probably the most
compelling factor favouring a conclusion that differential
treatment imposed by legislation is truly discriminatory.”127 The
court stated that homosexual persons have been disadvantaged
throughout Canada’s history. 128 However, the court also noted
that a particular legislation may not be discriminatory if the
distinction created by the law respects the group’s or individual’s liberty interest in making fundamental decisions regarding their lives.129
One of the essential values is liberty, basically defined as the
absence of coercion and the ability to make fundamental
choices with regard to one’s life. …Limitations imposed by this
court that serve to restrict this freedom of choice among persons in conjugal relationships would be contrary to our notions
130
of liberty.

The court held that the common law definition, requiring marriage to be between two people of the opposite sex denies people
in same-sex relationships a fundamental choice, whether or not
to marry their partner.131
The second factor is the “correspondence, or lack thereof, between the grounds on which the claim is based and the actual

125. Id. at 183–90.
126. Id. at 183 (“The list of factors is not closed and not all of the factors will
be relevant in every case.”).
127. Id. at 183–84 (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 534).
128. Id. at 184.
Sexual orientation is more than simply a “status” that an individual
possesses. It is something that is demonstrated in an individual’s
conduct by the choice of partner….Studies serve to confirm overwhelmingly that homosexuals, whether as individuals or couples,
form an identifiable minority who have suffered and continue to suffer serious social, political and economic disadvantage.
Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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needs, capacities, or circumstances of the claimant or others
with similar traits.”132 Legislation that accommodates the actual needs, capacities, and circumstances of the claimants is
less likely to demean dignity.133 Here, the government argued
that marriage relates to the needs, capacities, and circumstances of opposite-sex couples.134 The court rejected this argument because the question to be determined is whether the
law takes into account the needs, capacities, or circumstances of
same-sex, not opposite-sex couples.135 The purpose and effect of
the law in question must be viewed from the perspective of the
claimant, and here, the court determined that from the perspective of same-sex couples, the law did not meet their needs, capacities, or circumstances.136
The reason the law did not meet same-sex couple’s needs, capacities, or circumstances was because the law prevented them
from receiving the benefits of marriage. The court determined
that the recognized purposes of marriage include companionship, societal recognition, economic benefits, blending of two
families, and intimacy.137 In addition to the denial of these
benefits, prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying would
perpetuate the view that same-sex couples are not capable of
having the same type of relationship as opposite-sex couples
and that their relationships are not deserving of the same respect and recognition afforded to opposite-sex couples.138
Moreover, the court determined that the government’s argument here is more suited for a Section 1 and not a Section 15(1)
analysis because the Section 15(1) analysis at this stage re132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 186. (“[T]he fact that the impugned legislation may achieve a
valid social purpose for one group of individuals cannot function to deny an
equality claim where the effects of the legislation upon another person or
group conflict with the purpose of the § 15(1) guarantee.”).
136. Id. at 187.
137. Id.
138. Id. The government also argued that marriage as an institution is for
the capacities, needs and circumstances of heterosexual couples: “The concept
of marriage – across time, societies and legal cultures – is that of an institution to facilitate, shelter and nurture the unique relationship of a man and a
woman who, together, have the possibility to bear children from their relationship and shelter them within it.” Id. at 185–86.
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quires the court to “define the scope of the individual’s right to
equality, not to balance that right against societal values and
interests or other Charter rights.”139 Any balancing is done under Section 1.
The third factor is whether the law has “an ameliorative purpose or effect upon a more disadvantaged person or group in
society.”140 It was clear to the court that throughout Canada’s
history opposite-sex couples were more advantaged than samesex couples.141 In effect the court took judicial notice of the existence of this advantage, which allowed the court to determine
that the third factor was met.142
The fourth factor is the “nature of the interest affected by the
law.”143 The court stated that “[T]he more severe and localized
the effect of the law on the affected group, the greater the likelihood that the law is discriminatory.”144 The Attorney General
139. Id. at 186.
140. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 187. In Law, the court stated that “underinclusive ameliorative legislation that excludes from its scope the members of
a historically disadvantaged group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination.” Id. (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 539).
141. Id. at 188.
142. Id. at 187–88. The government proposed that because heterosexual
couples raise most of societies’ children, supporting these unions does not
further a historic advantage but, instead, ameliorates historic economic disadvantage that opposite-sex couples are faced with when raising children. Id.
at 187.
143. Id. at 188.
144. Id. For an example of how the courts determine this inquiry, Halpern
cited Law. Id. In Law, the court stated that the Charter protects more than
economic rights:
Although a search for economic prejudice may be a convenient means
to begin a Section 15 inquiry, a conscientious inquiry must not stop
here. The discriminatory caliber of a particular distinction cannot be
fully appreciated without also evaluating the constitutional and societal significance of the interest(s) adversely affected. Other important considerations involve determining whether the distinction
somehow restricts access to a fundamental social institution, or affects a basic aspect of full membership in Canadian society (e.g. voting, mobility). Finally, does the distinction constitute a complete
non-recognition of a particular group? It stands to reason that a
group’s interests will be more adversely affected in cases involving
complete exclusion or non-recognition than in cases where the legislative distinction does recognize or accommodate the group, but does so
in a manner that is simply more restrictive than some would like.
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 188 (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 540).
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pointed to the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act to
preclude a finding of discrimination.145 The court, however,
found that the Act did not give the same benefits and obligations to same-sex couples146 and, moreover, even under the Act,
same-sex couples were excluded from the actual act of participating in a legal marriage, an important and vital social institution.147 The court held that Section 15 guarantees more than
equal access to economic benefits; it also guarantees equal access to fundamental social institutions, such as marriage.148
Once the court determined that the common law definition of
marriage violated Section 15(1) of the Charter, the court then
examined whether the violation could be justified under Section
1 of the Charter.149
2. Section 1 Analysis
Section 1 states that “the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it are
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”150 If
a law violates Section 15(1) of the Charter, it can be upheld if it
is justified under Section 1.151 The party who wants the law up-

145. Id.
146. Id. at 189. (In numerous cases, benefits and obligations under the
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act are only given to same-sex
couples after they have lived together for a certain period of time, whereas
opposite-sex couples got them immediately.).
147. Id. (The court must consider whether the affected group has been excluded from “fundamental societal institutions.”).
148. Id. at 190.
149. Id.
150. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), §1.
151. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 190. Section 1 analysis requires a balancing of
an individual’s right against the state’s interest, however a Section 15(1)
analysis does not have this requirement. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act,
1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §1, construed in
Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, 809–10. Section 15(1), requires the
courts to “define the scope of the individual right to equality.” Id. Under Section 15(1), a claimant must provide a rational foundation for the experience of
discrimination and demonstrate that a similarly situated rational person
would share that experience; however, Section 1 requires the government to
justify that discrimination, not to explain it or deny its existence. Id.
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held must establish the justification for the law and has the
burden of proving that:
1. the objective of the law is pressing and substantial; and
2. the means chosen to achieve the objective are reasonably
and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.
This requires:
(A) The rights violation to be rationally connected to the
objective of the law;
(B) The impugned law to minimally impair the Charter
guarantee; and
(C) Proportionality between the effect of the law and its objective so that the attainment of the objective is not out152
weighed by the abridgment of the right.

At this stage, the burden was on the government to demonstrate a justification for the breach of human dignity caused by
the law.153 To meet its burden, the government could show the
practical, moral, economic, or social aspects of the law by demonstrating a need to protect other rights in the Charter, or by
establishing that what the law purports to do outweighs its
negative impact on human dignity.154
When the law in question is challenged as being underinclusive, as it is here, the objective of the entire law must be
examined along with the objective of the exclusion.155 Here, the
Attorney General argued that throughout history marriage has
always been between a man and a woman, and the purpose of
marriage is for uniting the opposite sexes, promoting companionship, and encouraging procreation.156 While the court agreed
152. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191 (quoting R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at
138–39). The Oakes court was the first court to formulate the test for determining whether a law is a reasonable limit on a Charter right or freedom in a
free and democratic society. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191. This became known
as the Oakes test. Id. The first stage of the Oakes test involves two steps:
first the objectives of the impugned law must be determined, and secondly, the
objective of the impugned law must be evaluated to see if the objective is capable of justifying limitations on Charter rights. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191
(interpreting R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138–39).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 186.
155. Id. at 191.
156. Id. at 191–92.
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that this has historically been the accepted notion of marriage,
the question before the court was whether perpetuating this
concept is a valid objective and whether the Attorney General
had given valid arguments for the court to support and perpetuate this definition of marriage.157 The court determined it
was not a valid objective and disagreed with all three rationales
put forth by the Attorney General.158
First, the court noted that merely stating that marriage is
heterosexual because it always has been that way is not an objective that can justify infringing upon a Charter value.159 The
court then went on to dismiss the other arguments provided by
the Attorney General. The first purpose given by the Attorney
General stated that marriage unites the opposite sexes.160 The
court held that this purpose values one form of relationship
over another and suggests that same-sex relationships are not
as legitimate as opposite-sex relationships.161 A purpose that
demeans the dignity of same-sex couples cannot be pressing and
substantial, since it is contrary to the values of a free and democratic society.162 Second, the encouragement of procreation
will not be impeded by allowing same-sex couples to marry and
heterosexual couples will not stop procreating if same-sex couples are entitled to marry.163 Moreover, heterosexual couples
and same-sex couples can adopt and heterosexual couples can
choose to not have children.164 Last, the third argument was
dismissed because encouraging companionship only between
opposite-sex couples perpetuates the notion that same-sex couples are not equally capable of forming loving relationships.165
While the court’s conclusion under the first stage of the
analysis was sufficient to determine that the Attorney General
did not meet his burden, the court went on to consider the remainder of the test.166 Under the rational connection test, the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 192.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 193.
Id.
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party seeking to uphold the law must show that the violation of
rights is rationally related to the objective.167 Here, the government would have to show that the exclusion of same-sex couples
from marriage is required to encourage procreation, childrearing, and companionship.168 The court held that the rational
connection test was not met because the “exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage is not necessary for the promotion of procreation, childrearing, and companionship.”169 The court found
that the law was both under and over-inclusive.170 It was overinclusive because the ability to naturally conceive children and
willingness to raise children are not prerequisites for oppositesex marriage.171 The law was under-inclusive because it excluded same-sex couples who have and raise children.172 The
court determined that even if it had concluded that the Attorney General’s objectives were pressing and substantial, these
objectives were not rationally connected to the opposite-sex requirement for marriage.173
As for minimal impairment,174 because same-sex couples were
completely excluded from the institution of marriage, it was
clear that there was significantly more impairment than
“minimal.”175 Furthermore, the court stated that any alterna-

167. Id. at 194.
168. Id.
169. Id
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Minimal impairment relates to the second prong of the Oakes test. See
supra Part II.B.2.
175. Id. at 196. The Attorney General submitted that the means chosen by
Parliament to achieve its objectives impairs the rights of gays and lesbians as
minimally as possible:
Although same-sex relationships are not granted legal recognition,
gay men and lesbians have the right to choose their partners and to
celebrate their relationships through commitment ceremonies. Additionally, same-sex couples have achieved virtually all of the federal
benefits that flow from marriage with the passing of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act.
Id. at 195.
The court, however, did not accept this assertion, and stated it did not
believe that same-sex couples have achieved equal access to government bene-
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tive to the legal institution of marriage was not an adequate
substitute.176
Under the Section 1 analysis, the court determined that the
Attorney General’s objectives for the prohibition against samesex marriage did not justify the exclusion of same-sex couples
from the institution of marriage.177
3. Remedy
To remedy the situation, the court replaced the common law
definition of marriage with a new definition of its own creation:
“The voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of
all others.”178 The court also determined that this definition was
to have immediate effect, that the Clerk of the City of Toronto
was to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and that the
Registrar General of the Province of Ontario was to accept the
marriage certificates of same-sex couples.179
III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THE UNITED STATES
Canada is not the only nation to grapple with same-sex marriage, nor are its courts the only courts to establish under which
standard of constitutionality a law prohibiting same-sex couples
to marry should be scrutinized. The U.S. court system has also
been called upon to address issues of gay rights, although its
highest court has not yet addressed the issue of same-sex marriage. Looking at how the U.S. courts interpret the Equal Protection Clause and how the Supreme Court of the United States
has applied the clause to laws which discriminate on the basis
of homosexuality will help to understand how the Court will
rule on the issue of same-sex marriage if, or when, it appears
before it.

fits and that marriage should not be viewed purely in economic terms. Id. at
194–95.
176. Id. at 195 (“Same-sex couples and their children should be able to benefit from the same stabilizing institution as their opposite-sex counterparts.”).
177. Id. at 196.
178. Id. at 197.
179. Id. at 199.
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A. Origins and Background
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, stated
“[i]n view of the Constitution, in the eyes of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens….
The Equal Protection Clause neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.”180 The basis for equal protection is
found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.181
It states that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”182 The interpretation of
the amendment has been left mainly to the Supreme Court.183
The Equal Protection Clause comes into play whenever the government treats two groups differently.
When determining whether a particular statute is a violation
of equal protection rights, a U.S. court must first decide the appropriate standard of review.184 To do this, the court must ascertain the basis for the claim of discrimination, such as race,
gender, or sexual orientation.185 These and other categories of
discrimination have been divided into three levels of review;
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis.186

180. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Harlan went on to
say that “[T]he thin disguise of equal accommodation will not mislead anyone,
nor atone for the wrong this day.” Id. at 562.
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1.
182. Id.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
183. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
601–04 (2002). “More than a century after the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, the question of the inherent content of equal protection continues
to be a subject of intense debate.” Id. at 601.
184. Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A
Netherlands-United States Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW. 141,
159 (2001).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Strict scrutiny, the highest standard of review, is applied to
classes of discrimination that the court deems “suspect
classes.”187 This includes claims of unequal treatment based on
race, alienage, or national origin.188 If a law is subjected to this
level of review, it will be declared unconstitutional unless the
state can provide a “compelling state interest”189 and that the
discriminatory means employed substantially relate to the
achievement of the state interest.190 Under this analysis, most
statutes will be struck down.191 This is because the state must
show the law is “necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the discrimination….,”192
which places an exceptionally high burden on the state.
At the middle level, which encompasses “quasi-suspect
classes” such as gender and illegitimacy, the court will apply
heightened, or intermediate scrutiny.193 This level requires the
state to show that “the legislative use of the classification ‘reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal
protection that furthers a substantial interest of the state.’”194
Under intermediate scrutiny, the party seeking to defend the
law must show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the
law.195 The Court in United States v. Virginia stated that the
state must show “at least that the challenged classification
serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.”196 The Court went on to state
that “[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation.”197

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
190. See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
191. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159.
192. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
193. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 183, at 647.
194. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159–60.
195. See e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (This case concerned a gender based law.).
196. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
197. Id. at 533.
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Classification based on gender receives heightened review because these classifications “very likely reflect outmoded notions
of the relative capabilities of men and women.”198 Moreover,
classifications based on illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny because “illegitimacy is beyond the individual’s control and
bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and
contribute to society.”199
The lowest level of review, the “rational basis” test, is used
when there is no suspect classification involved.200 The Supreme
Court has determined that age,201 poverty,202 mental retardation,203 and sexual orientation204 are not suspect classes. Under
rational review it is the petitioner who has the burden of demonstrating that the discrimination is not “rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.”205 Typically, statutes which
come under the rational basis test are found to be constitu198. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. See also Josiah N. Drew, Caught
Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Ameliorating the Collision Course of Sexual Orientation Anti-discrimination Rights and Religious Free Exercise Rights
in the Public Workplace 16 BYU J.PUB. L. 287, 301 (2002).
199. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (quoting Matthew v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 505 (1976)). See also Drew, supra note 198, at 287.
200. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (quoting Matthew v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 505 (1976)). See also Drew, supra note 198, at 287.
201. See generally Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976) (holding that laws that discriminate on the basis of age should only
receive rational basis review).
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly
free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not
experienced a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics
not truly indicative of their abilities.
Id. at 313.
202. See generally James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding that
laws that discriminate on the basis of wealth should only receive rational
basis review). See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (stating
that this Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification).
203. See generally City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441–43 (holding that laws
that discriminate on the basis of mental retardation should only receive rational basis review).
204. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that laws
that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation should only receive rational basis review).
205. Id.
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tional, since all the court requires to uphold the law is a legitimate government reason for the discrimination, a very low burden for the state.206
To determine whether a suspect class or quasi-suspect class
is involved, the court uses a three-part analysis.207 The origin of
this three-part test comes from often cited Footnote 4 of the
United States v. Carolene Products.208 First, the court looks to
see if the class has a history of discrimination.209 Second, the
court determines the immutability of the class characteristic.210
Finally, the court examines whether the class is politically powerless enough to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.211
B. Equal Protection Cases and Their Application to Sexual
Orientation
The two most notable Supreme Court cases addressing sexual
orientation and equal protection are Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas.212 In Romer, the Colorado legislature enacted a
law that denied homosexuals any express statutory protections.213 The law prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial
action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the named class.”214 The named class was homosexual persons.215 By applying the rational basis test the Court deter206. Id.
207. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearing Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Timothy Verhoff, Comment, Class Struggles: A
Century After the Ku Klux Klan Act and Still Seeking Protection for the Disabled, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 153, 168 (1999).
208. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
209. Drew, supra note 198, at 303.
210. Id.
211. San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973). See also Verhoff, supra note 207, at 168.
212. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (striking down the Colorado law as discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation). See generally
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (striking down a Texas anti sodomy law as a
violation of due process). The majority decided Lawrence on Due Process
grounds, however, Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence stated that she would
have decided the case on the basis of equal protection. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
564, 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
213. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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mined that the Colorado state law was a violation of equal protection.216 Since the Court concluded that the law’s only purpose
was animus towards a particular group of people, namely homosexuals, the Court found that the law could not survive even
under the rational review test. 217 Since the Court held that the
law failed under rational review, it did not need to address the
question of whether a heightened standard of review for sexual
orientation was required.218
Of particular concern to the Court was how the state attempted to use the Equal Protection Clause to further its desire
to harm a politically unpopular group.219 The Court stated that
at a bare minimum the Equal Protection Clause could not allow
this.220 It further determined that a statute that “classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else” will be unconstitutional.221 This
216. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (striking down the Colorado law and
holding that the law was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). In this
case, Colorado enacted a law known as Amendment 2 which essentially denied homosexuals the right to receive aid from the government. Id. at 624.
The statute stated:
No protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. at 624.
217. Id. at 633 (“[B]y requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”).
218. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (striking down the Colorado law and
holding that the law was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
219. Id. at 634. The state argued that by removing these rights from homosexual citizens of Colorado, it was putting them in the same place, politically,
as the rest of its citizens. Id. at 626. The statute, the state said, does no more
than deny homosexuals special rights. Id.
220. Id.
221. Mark Strasser, Loving in the New Millennium: On Equal Protection
and the Right to Marry, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH ROUNDTABLE 61, 78 (2000).
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analysis is in line with Canada’s determination that homosexuals in Canadian society have been subjected to discrimination in
a way that makes them unequal to everyone else and, therefore,
under Section 15(1) and Section 1 of the Charter, are entitled to
protection.222 The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution, like Section 15(1) of the Charter, is to protect politically unpopular and disadvantaged groups.223
The Romer Court’s decision demonstrates that the Supreme
Court is gradually becoming more sensitive to gay and lesbian
rights.224 However, Romer only determined that a bare desire to
harm a group is not a legitimate interest.225 Therefore, with
only Romer as precedent it would be difficult for the Court to
strike down a state law that banned same-sex marriage. The
rational basis test would likely allow a state to produce what
the Court could determine to be a legitimate government interest.226 Moreover, many lawyers have found the Court’s reasoning in Romer evasive, and have criticized it for not providing an
enduring or workable legal framework, which the Court had
done in previous race and gender cases.227
It is yet to be determined whether Lawrence v. Texas, the
next case addressing constitutional questions concerning sexual
orientation and equal protection, created the legal framework
necessary to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples and
expand the rights of homosexuals in general.228 While the Lawrence majority decided the case on due process grounds,229 Jus222. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 184.
223. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1. See also United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. at 557; CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), §15 and §1; See also Layland, 104 D.L.R. at 223
(Greer, J., dissenting).
224. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (holding that the Colorado law
which discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation could not survive even
rational basis review).
225. Id.
226. See infra Part IV for a more thorough discussion.
227. Sanders, supra note 7, at 3C.
228. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (striking down a law that imposed criminal sanctions for engaging in sodomy).
229. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. The Lawrence majority relied on the Due
Process Clause and its implicit protection of the right to privacy. Id. (holding
that the Texas law was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause). The
Court found that the consequences of the Texas law, which made it a crime for
a person to “engage in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual or
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tice O’Connor stated in her concurrence that she would have
decided the case on equal protection grounds.230
While
O’Connor’s conclusion may help the overall plight of homosexuals, it hampers similar progress in relation to same-sex marriage because she specifically stated that in her opinion, a state
could put forth a legitimate reason to prohibit same-sex marriage.231 O’Conner stated that, under the rational basis test, the
law in Lawrence was unconstitutional since it applied only to
homosexuals.232 Although she noted that most laws survive under the rational basis test, she stated that when the challenged
legislation inhibits personal relationships, the Court is most
likely to find the law unconstitutional.233 Here, she determined
that there is no legitimate government interest in protecting
the morals of a particular group.234 She stated that the Court
has never held that “moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal
Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among
groups of persons.”235 Moral disapproval, she stated, like a bare
desire to harm a group, should not satisfy the rational basis
test.236
However, O’Connor ended her concurrence by stating that all
laws differentiating between heterosexuals and homosexuals
would not automatically be considered unconstitutional.237 If
the state puts forth a legitimate reason, the law will be upheld.238 Under this reasoning, the state could hide its moral disthe same sex,” involved more than denying the right to engage in sexual acts,
it also involved criminal penalties and sought to control behavior involving
personal relationships in the privacy of one’s own home. Id. at 567–69.
Adults, the court said, may choose to enter into a sexual relationship in their
own home and private lives, and still maintain their dignity and freedom:
“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice.” Id. at 576.
230. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (Since the
Texas sodomy law only applied to homosexuals, O’Connor relied on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.).
231. Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 580.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 582.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 585.
238. Id.
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approval of homosexuals behind what the Court will accept as
legitimate state interests. One such instance, she stated, would
be to preserve the institution of marriage.239 She did not however, provide any rationale for why the protection of marriage
includes reserving it for couples of the opposite sex.240
O’Connor’s reasoning is similar to the rationale used by the Canadian Supreme Court in Egan.241 In Egan, the court was willing to proclaim that most laws that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation are unconstitutional but, unlike the court in
Halpern, it was unwilling to hold that a prohibition on same-sex
marriage was unconstitutional as well.242
IV. SEXUAL ORIENTATION SHOULD BE ELEVATED FROM A “NONSUSPECT” CLASS TO A “SUSPECT” CLASS
Both the United States and Canada have constitutional
guarantees for fundamental freedoms and equality.243 Both
countries’ constitutions can be, and have been, used to litigate
in the area of relationship recognition.244 As noted above, the
litigation in Canada has fallen under Section 15(1) and Section
1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and U.S. claims have
been made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
There are notable differences between the modes of analysis
used by Canadian courts and the U.S. courts. Canadian courts
have determined that a law cannot discriminate based on the

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See generally Egan, 2 S.C.R. 513 (The court found that most laws that
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation are unconstitutional, however,
the court was not willing to extend this rationale and hold that a prohibition
on same-sex was unconstitutional.).
242. Id. In O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, she stated that although
she thought the law in question was unconstitutional, she specifically declared
that her opinion should not be extended to laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
243. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1; See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act,
1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §15 and §1.
244. Nicole LaViolette, Waiting in a New Line at City Hall: Registered Partnerships as an Option for Relationship Recognition Reform in Canada, 19 CAN
J. FAM. L. 115, 161 (2002).
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traits enumerated in Section 15(1) of the Charter,245 nor on any
ground analogous to those listed, including sexual orientation.246
If a law is challenged as being discriminatory under Section
15(1) of the Charter, the court must first determine whether the
law actually is discriminating against a particular individual or
group of people.247 If the law is found to be discriminatory, the
court then turns to Section 1 and determines whether the discrimination imposed by the law can be justified by a legitimate
state interest.248 Canada, unlike the United States, does not
first determine which class the recipient of the disparate treatment falls into before determining which level of scrutiny to
apply to the law; instead, the Canadian courts afford the same
level of review to all laws that are found to be discriminatory
under Section 15(1).249
Therefore, in Canada, discrimination based on sexual orientation receives the same level of scrutiny as discrimination based
on race, whereas in the United States discrimination based on
race receives a level of scrutiny significantly higher than the
level afforded to discrimination based on sexual orientation.250
In the United States, the level of scrutiny will determine how
strong the state’s interest must be in order for the state’s law to
be upheld, whereas in Canada the state’s interest does not vary
based upon who or what group is being discriminated against.251
The Canadian courts have determined that barring same-sex
couples from the institution of marriage is a violation of Section
15(1) of the Charter since it is discriminatory and the violation
cannot be saved under Section 1 because the legislature did not
put forth any pressing and substantial objective for the law.252
The Canadian analysis under Section 15(1) and Section 1 is
most similar to the U.S. level of intermediate scrutiny.

245. CAN CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), §15 (Section 15(1) lists race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.).
246. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.
247. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179.
248. Law, 1 S.C.R. at 529. See discussion supra Part II.
249. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159; Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179–90.
250. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159; Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.
251. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159; Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179–90.
252. See generally Halpern, 65 O.R. 3d 161 (holding that the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples violated Section 15(1) of the Charter).
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Under the current state of the Equal Protection Clause, it
would be harder for the U.S. Supreme Court to reach the same
conclusion as the Halpern court did. This is because sexual orientation has been deemed a “non-suspect” class, and therefore
only receives rational review.253 As stated earlier, under rational review it is the plaintiff who has the burden of demonstrating that the discrimination is not “rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.”254 This is a lower standard
than Canada’s “pressing and substantial objective” for the law.
Typically, statutes which come under the rational basis test are
found to be constitutional, since all the court requires to uphold
the law is a legitimate government interest for the discrimination.255
When a plaintiff brings a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause stating that a law is discriminatory based on sexual orientation most courts will apply rational basis review.256 However, based on the three criteria from Carolene Products Footnote 4 discussed in Part III, this level of review is arguably incorrect.257 This is because gays and lesbians have suffered a history of discrimination, sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic, and while it may be claimed that gays and lesbians
253. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (holding that sexual orientation
should only receive rational basis review).
254. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159.
255. Id.
256. See In re Cooper 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993) (applying rational
th
basis review in response to 14 Amendment claims challenging classifications
based on sexual orientation); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d
809, 829–30 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (in the Eighth Circuit, discrimination based on
sexual orientation is subject to rational basis review); Miguel v. Guess, 51
P.3d 89, 97 n3 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the court need not reach
question of suspect classification based upon sexual orientation as policy in
question violated federal Equal Protection Clause based even upon rational
basis test), review denied by Miguel v. Guess, 2003 Wash. LEXIS 171 (Wash.
2003); Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp.2d 1279, 1287–89 (D. Utah
1998) (holding that the decision not to assign a teacher to the position of volleyball coach based on her sexual orientation had no rational basis and violated Equal Protection Clause); Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 21 F. Supp.2d 858,
862 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (sexual orientation does not involve a suspect classification or impact a fundamental interest, and thus, equal protection claims on
this basis are examined under the rational basis test); Anderson v. Kind
County, 2004 WL 1738447 *5 (finding homosexuals not a suspect class on
basis that older federal cases had ruled homosexuals were not a suspect class).
257. See supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text.
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are not politically powerless, other groups that have political
power receive heightened scrutiny.258
The first criteria under Carolene Products is that the class
must have a demonstrated history of discrimination.259 It is basically conceded, even by opponents of elevating sexual orientation to heightened scrutiny, that homosexuals have had a history of discrimination in the United States.260 Moreover, the
only courts that have addressed the issue agree that while homosexuals are not a suspect class, they have a history of discrimination.261 The Halpern court easily made the same determination. Citing Egan, the court stated “[T]he historic disadvantage suffered by homosexual persons has been widely recognized and documented.”262
While historic disadvantage remains uncontroversial, the
second criteria from Footnote 4, immutability, has been
strongly debated.263 Gay rights advocates say that sexual orientation is a genetically influenced characteristic and not a choice
and, therefore, is immutable.264 The Canadian Supreme Court
agrees with this.265 In Egan, the court stated that sexual orientation is “a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal
costs.”266 In part because of its immutability, the court in Egan
unanimously affirmed that sexual orientation is an analogous
ground to those enumerated in Section 15(1).267
Opponents of granting heightened review to sexual orientation say that anti-sodomy laws single out homosexuals for voluntary behavior, not a common orientation.268 Most courts have
accepted this argument:269 “[a]s the Sixth Circuit stated, ‘Those
persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual orientation are so affected not because of their orientation
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Drew, supra note 198, at 303; Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.
Drew, supra note 198, at 303.
Id.
Id.
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 184 (quoting Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 600–02).
Drew, supra note 198, at 304–05.
Drew, supra note 198, at 304.
Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.
Id.
Id.
Drew, supra note 198, at 304.
Id. at 305.
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but rather by their conduct which identifies them as homosexual.’”270 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit stated that “homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and
hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already existing suspect and
quasi-suspect classes.”271 But this argument is no more than a
semantic sleight-of-hand. When one says that a person is “gay”
or a “lesbian” they are not saying merely that the person engages in sexual activity with others of the same sex.272 Rather,
they are recognizing something fundamental about the person,
which is that the person’s most intimate feelings of love and
companionship are directed towards members of the same sex.273
Clearly, the Canadian Supreme Court does not think that sexual orientation is fundamentally different from race, gender, or
alienage.274 In fact, when the court determined that sexual orientation was analogous to those classes already listed in Section 15(1), it gave sexual orientation the same status as race,
gender, and alienage.275
Political powerlessness is the third criterion from Carolene
Products276 and, like immutability, whether homosexuals are in
fact politically powerless has been the subject of ongoing debate.277 When courts determine whether a group is politically
powerless, they tend to consider whether the group has been

270. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,
th
267 (6 Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). See also
Drew, supra note 198, at 304.
271. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573–74. See also Darren Lenard Hutchison, Discrimination and Inequality Emerging Issues “Gay Rights” for “Gay
Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL
L.REV. 1358, 1379 (2000).
272. This notion was articulated in Egan when the court stated that sexual
orientation is “a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or
changeable only at unacceptable personal costs.” Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.
273. The dissenting opinion in Egan stated that “sexual orientation is more
than simply a ‘status’ that an individual possesses: it is something that is
demonstrated in an individual's conduct by the choice of a partner.” Egan, 2
S.C.R. at 601 (Cory, J. and Iacobucci, J., dissenting).
274. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.
275. Id.
276. Drew, supra note 198, at 303.
277. Patrick Otto Bomberg, A Survey of Recent Cases Affecting the Rights of
Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 392, 394 (1993).
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able to attract the attention of lawmakers.278 In City of Cleburne, the Court stated that “any minority can be said to be
powerless to assert direct control over the legislature, but if
that were a criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts,
much economic and social legislation would now be suspect.”279
This view was adopted by the Ninth Circuit when it found that
homosexuals were not politically powerless. It stated that “legislatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimination suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through the passage of anti-discrimination legislation.
Thus, homosexuals are not without political power; they have
the ability to and do ‘attract the attention of the lawmakers,’ as
evidenced by such legislation.”280
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer is in line with the view that
homosexuals are not politically powerless.281 Scalia stated
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have
high disposable income, and, of course, care about homosexual
rights issues much more ardently than the public at large,
they possess political power much greater than their numbers,
both locally and statewide. Quite understandably, they devote
this political power to achieving not merely a grudging social
282
toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.

Scalia, in describing gays and lesbians as wealthy and politically powerful, is asserting that he believes they are “undeserving of judicial protection.”283 But Scalia does not provide any
support for his factual assertions. Rather, the fact that thirtynine states have enacted Defense Of Marriage Acts, and only
one state supports gay marriage (and only by virtue of a court
278. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445 (In regard to subjecting the mentally
retarded to rational review, the court stated that this class was not politically
powerless: “[T]he legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and
survived without public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded
are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the
attention of the lawmakers.”).
279. Id.
280. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574.
281. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. Hutchison, supra note 271, at 1382 (arguing that Scalia characterizes
gay and lesbian civil rights efforts as an exertion of this disproportionate
power).
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decision, not legislative action) indicates that homosexuals do
not have political clout.284 The Ninth Circuit is correct in stating
that homosexuals do attract the attention the lawmakers, but
this attention is to the overwhelming detriment of gays and lesbians.
Moreover, the argument that heightened scrutiny depends in
part on whether a group is politically powerless no longer holds
water. Gender discrimination or, rather, laws that discriminate
against women, receive heightened scrutiny; however, it is no
longer plausible to say that women are a politically powerless
group. Currently, women occupy fourteen seats in the Senate
and sixty-eight seats in the House of Representatives.285 In his
dissent in United States v. Virginia, Scalia argued that women
are not politically powerless.286 He stated “it is hard to consider
women a ‘discrete and insular minority’ unable to employ the
‘political process ordinarily to be relied upon,’ when they constitute a majority of the electorate…. Moreover, a long list of legislation proves the proposition false.”287 The court in Halpern
did not even examine whether homosexuals were politically
powerless, presumably because it is irrelevant. Presumably
284. DOMA Watch, available at http://www.domawatch.org/index.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2005). The eleven states that do not have junior DOMA’s are
the following: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Peterson, supra note 8. But it should be noted that in New Hampshire and Wyoming there is a state law that bans same-sex marriage and predates DOMA laws; and in Wisconsin there has been a state Supreme Court
ruling stating that only heterosexual marriages are legal. Id. See generally
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (holding that the prohibition on same-sex marriage violated the Massachusetts constitution).
285. Guide to the New Congress, available at http://oncongress.cq.com/
corp/flatfiles/editorialFiles/temporaryItems/mon20041103-3demographics.pdf.
(last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
286. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 575–76. The legislation Scalia spoke of includes the Equal Pay
Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments,
the Women’s Business Ownership Act, and the Violence Against Women Act.
See Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1993); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964); Title IX of the Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (1972); Women’s Business Ownership Act, Pub. L. No. 100-533, 102
Stat. 2689 (1988); Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 107-249,
108 Stat. 1902. The U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Morrison held that the
Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).

File: Allyson MACRO 03.30.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 3/30/2005 2:22 PM

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:16 PM

591

Canada has anti-discrimination laws much like the United
States, but the Canadian courts do not use these laws against
those claiming discrimination.
We see that sexual orientation meets the first two criteria for
heightened scrutiny and, arguably, the third test (if it is necessary to apply it) as well. In fact, there have been some state
courts that have granted sexual orientation the heightened
level of scrutiny it deserves.288 The Court of Appeals of Oregon
had “no difficulty” concluding that sexual orientation is a suspect class and stated that “sexual orientation, like gender, race,
alienage, and religious affiliation is widely regarded as defining
a distinct, socially recognized group of citizens, and certainly it
is beyond dispute that homosexuals in our society have been
and continue to be the subject of adverse social and political
stereotyping and prejudice.” 289
If sexual orientation is granted heightened scrutiny, as it
should be, then it would be nearly impossible for a law prohibiting same-sex marriage to survive. Under the heightened scrutiny test, the state must show that “the legislative use of the
classification ‘reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the
ideal of equal protection that furthers a substantial interest of
the state’”290 and the party seeking to defend the law must show
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the law.291
The
standard for the Canadian courts is virtually the same, which is
that the law must be pressing and substantial and the means
chosen to achieve the objective are reasonably and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.292 Applying the
Canadian courts standard to the case before it, the Halpern
court’s analysis led it to its holding that there was no “pressing
and substantial” legislative reason for justifying the discrimina288. See generally Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (dismissing
case in which same-sex couples sought to be married based on intervening
amendment to the state constitution, but noting that sexual orientation constitutes a suspect classification and therefore would be subject to heightened
scrutiny); Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 524 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998) (same-sex couples constitute a suspect class for purposes of constitutional discrimination analysis).
289. Tanner, 971 P.2d 524 (The court did not discuss the politically powerlessness of homosexuals.).
290. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159–60.
291. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
292. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191.
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tory law. Using the same analysis and applying it to the U.S.
standard of heightened scrutiny, the U.S. courts should come to
the same conclusion as the Canadian courts.
V. UNDER CURRENT UNITED STATES JURISPRUDENCE, THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT SHOULD REACH THE SAME CONCLUSION AS
HALPERN
While the U.S. Supreme Court should give sexual orientation
heightened scrutiny, even under a rational review standard the
Court should conclude that a ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. Although Halpern’s analysis is most similar to
intermediate scrutiny, the court's analysis of the arguments
given by the Attorney General would yield the same result under a rational basis review standard. Support for this conclusion is found in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in
which the Massachusetts Supreme Court applied a rational review standard to the arguments advanced by the Massachusetts
Attorney General in support of denying the right to marry to
same-sex couples.293 In Goodridge, the court held that a prohibition on same-sex marriage failed the rational review test, and
was therefore unconstitutional under Massachusetts law. 294
In Goodridge, the state proposed three reasons to justify the
refusal to allow same-sex marriages:295 (1) the traditional notion
that marriage’s primary purpose is procreation; (2) opposite-sex
marriage ensures that children are raised in the optimal set-

293. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. The Massachusetts courts use the same
language as the Supreme Court of the United States for rational review: “[a]
regulatory authority must, at the very least, serve ‘a legitimate purpose in a
rational way’; a statute must ‘bear a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective.’” Id. at 960-61. In Goodridge the court stated that since the
statute did not survive rational basis review it did not need to consider
whether sexual orientation was entitled to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 961.
294. Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding Bells Heard Around the World: Years
From Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?, 24
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589, 657 (2004) (“The court found that the exclusion of marriage for same-sex couples failed to pass the rational basis test for both Due
Process and Equal Protection. The decision was hailed as the wedding bell
that might be heard around the world.”).
295. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960–61.
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ting; and 3) desire to conserve scarce state and private financial
resources.296
The first argument was rejected for the same reasons the argument was rejected in Halpern. The court found that procreation is not a condition of marriage; instead it said that the essence of marriage is a mutual commitment.297 Furthermore, the
court stated that marriage should not remain a heterosexual
union merely because historically it has only been a heterosexual union.298 The Halpern court rejected the same argument
made by the Attorney General.299 In Halpern, the Attorney
General wanted to preserve the institution of marriage as heterosexual because it had always been that way.300 In response,
the court stated that “stating that marriage is heterosexual because it has always been heterosexual is merely an explanation
for the opposite-sex requirement of marriage; it is not an objective that is capable of justifying the infringement of a Charter
guarantee.”301 As for the second argument, the court held that
while protecting children is a legitimate state policy, denying
same-sex marriage will not achieve that policy because the best
interest of a child does not depend on a parent’s sexual orientation.302 The court found there was “no rational relationship between the marriage statute and the Commonwealth’s proffered
goal of protecting the ‘optimal’ child rearing unit.”303
Under the third rationale, the state argued that same-sex
couples are more financially independent than married couples
and less reliant on public resources.304 The court rejected this
argument, stating that the “absolute statutory ban on same-sex
296. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960. See also Wojcik, supra note 294, at 663–
67. Other arguments, which were not as strong as these three, were put forth
by the state and were subsequently rejected by the court. Goodridge, 798
N.E.2d at 965–69.
297. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. See also Wojcik, supra note 294, at 664.
298. Id. at 332.
299. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 190.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961–63. “The demographic changes of the
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The
composition of families varies greatly from household to household.” Id. at
963.
303. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963.
304. Id.

File: Allyson MACRO 03.30.05.doc

594

Created on: 3/30/2005 2:22 PM

Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:16 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 30:2

marriage bears no rational relationship to the goal of economy.”305 The Halpern court rejected a similar argument finding
that because both same-sex and opposite-sex couples raise children, the argument that only opposite-sex couples should receive an economic benefit from the state is not viable.306
There were other arguments advanced by the state and subsequently rejected by the court.307 While they were not as strong
as the first three, one of them is worthy of note. The Commonwealth argued that same-sex marriage would “trivialize or destroy the institution of marriage as it has historically been fashioned.”308 The court rejected this argument, stating that samesex couples did not want to abolish the institution of marriage,
but wanted access to it.309 The rejection of this argument by the
court echoes Halpern, which stated that “it is not disputed that
marriage has been a stabilizing and effective societal institution. The Couples (same-sex couples) are not seeking to abolish
the institution of marriage; they are seeking access to it.”310
Not only did the Goodridge court reach the same conclusion
as Halpern under a rational review test, but it also cited
Halpern when it determined the proper remedy to apply. The
Goodridge court found that Canada’s new definition of marriage, being “the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to
the exclusion of all others,” should also be Massachusetts’ new
definition of marriage.311 The Massachusetts court made a powerful statement by declaring that even under a rational basis
review, a prohibition on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional.
However, since the Massachusetts court did not discuss
whether a prohibition on same-sex marriage violated the U.S.
Constitution, and because this case was decided completely as a
violation of the state constitution,312 it remains to be seen
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 188.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963–65.
Id.
Id.
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 194.
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 197. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.

The Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty
against government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than
does the Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ
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whether the U.S. Supreme Court would reach the same conclusions based on a rational level of review. However, as demonstrated by both Halpern and Goodridge, there is no rational
reason for the prohibition on same-sex marriage.
After examining the arguments in these cases it seems clear
that the only remaining argument for banning same-sex marriage is that marriage traditionally has been only between opposite-sex couples. But as Halpern and Goodridge stated, arguing that marriage should be heterosexual because it has always
been that way is not a sufficient reason for discriminating
against a certain group of people.313 Moreover, the argument
that our society should continue to do something because it is
the way it has traditionally been done is not a sufficient ground
for upholding a discriminatory practice. If tradition were permitted to be a rationale for upholding a discriminatory law,
then different races would not be permitted to marry,314 women

essentially the same language. That the Massachusetts Constitution
is in some instances more protective of individual liberty interests
than is the Federal Constitution is not surprising. Fundamental to
the vigor of our Federal system of government is that ‘state courts are
absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord
greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of
the United States Constitution.
Id. at 959 (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995)).
313. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 192.
314. For a more thorough discussion, see RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL
INTIMACIES (2003) (describing and assessing the beliefs, customs, laws, and
institutions of interracial relationships).
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would be considered the property of their husbands,315 and slavery would still exist.316
VI. CONCLUSION
Once it is established that a statute discriminates against a
recognized class, the Canadian courts determine the constitutionality of the statute by analyzing whether the purpose of the
statute is pressing and substantial and whether the means chosen to achieve the objective are reasonably and demonstrably
justifiable in a free and democratic society.317 The U.S. courts
should use the same analysis under the heightened scrutiny
test, although under the current state of the law the U.S. courts
would use the rational review test. Regardless of the test used
by U.S. courts, as Halpern and Goodridge demonstrate, the arguments made to justify prohibitions on same-sex marriage,
including that the purpose of marriage is to unite the opposite
sexes, encourage procreation, and companionship, are insufficient to support a continued ban on same-sex unions.318
Whether sexual orientation is granted the heightened scrutiny it deserves or the courts choose to continue to use rational
review, there is no constitutional basis for denying same-sex
couples the same right to marry enjoyed by heterosexual couples. Many people in both the United States and Canada hold
strong religious and moral views against same-sex marriages
315. For a more thorough discussion, see ALVAH L. STINSON, WOMEN UNDER
LAW (1914) (discusses the rights, privileges, and disabilities of women
th
under the law at the turn of the 20 century). See also Michael L. Rustad &
Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) (“At
common law, women were classified as personal property of the male head of
household.”); Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1164, n.102 (1992) (“At common law, the husband had extensive rights in
his wife’s property, and she lacked the power to contract or engage in litigation except through her husband.”); Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case For Equal TreatmentUnder the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 89, 89–94 (1994).
316. For a more thorough discussion, see ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (2004) (discussing the history and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the concept of freedom).
317. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191.
318. Id. at 188–94.

THE
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and homosexuality, based on their personal religious beliefs and
views of morality.319 However, as a legal matter, these beliefs
and views do not determine whether a law is unconstitutionally
discriminatory. 320 As stated by the court in Goodridge,
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical
convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one
man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral. Many hold equally strong religious, moral, and ethical
convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be married,
and that homosexual persons should be treated no differently
than their heterosexual neighbors. Neither view answers the
question before us. Our concern is with the Massachusetts
Constitution as a charter of governance for every person properly within its reach. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of
321
all, not to mandate our own moral code.”

Both Canadian and U.S. courts have found that “tradition” is
not a sufficient constitutional justification for discrimination.
319. See e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948; Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights Not Moral Opinion, 27 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 345, 354–55 (2004); Gary Chamberlain, Same-Sex Marriage: A
Religious Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 495
(2004); Religious Tolerance.Org, available at http://www.religioustolerance.
org/hom_marb.htm.
320. Justice Scalia, however, does believe that morality can and even should
influence the court. In his dissent in Romer, he stated that he believed that
the Colorado legislature was not hiding behind a “bare desire to harm” homosexuals, but preserving what it determined to be traditional sexual mores.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The State, he believes, is entitled to make this determination. Id. Under Scalia’s interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause, a state legislature would be permitted to determine
that a particular practice, even if based on race, is morally unacceptable, and
thus, is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. With Scalia’s analysis
of the Equal Protection Clause, states could still have anti-miscegenation
laws. If Scalia’s reasoning is followed to its logical conclusion, then even under the strict scrutiny test, a law supporting segregation could be upheld if it
were based on traditional customs, which at one point in our country’s history
there were. Scalia seems to be saying that as long as a law is in accord with
the majority of society’s view of morality, it will be constitutional.
Justice Stevens, however, stated in his dissent in Bowers that “the fact
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
321. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (quoting Lawrence 539 U.S. at 571).

File: Allyson MACRO 03.30.05.doc

598

Created on: 3/30/2005 2:22 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:16 PM

[Vol. 30:2

As stated by Lord Sankey in Edwards v. A.G. Canada, “[t]he
British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”322 This
“living tree” is the Canadian Constitution and as Halpern aptly
stated,
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different
from that of construing a statute. A statute defines present
rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to
the future. Its function is to provide a continuing framework
for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when
joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its
provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must,
therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to
meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these con323
siderations in mind.

The U.S. courts have utilized a similar approach. As stated
in United States v. Virginia, “[a] prime part of the history of our
constitution is the story of the extension of constitutional rights
and protections to people once ignored or excluded.”324 The U.S.
courts should not permit “tradition” any more than personal
religious beliefs or views of morality to substitute for the kind of
legal and logical analyses used by the courts in Halpern and
Goodridge. Those courts’ analyses show that prohibitions on
same-sex marriage cannot withstand heightened scrutiny or

322. Halpern, 65 O.R. 3d at 175 (quoting Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930]
A.C. 124).
323. Halpern, 65 O.R. 3d at 175 (quoting Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2
S.C.R. 145, 155).
324. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557.
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rational review, and should be held to be unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution, as they were under the Canadian
Charter.
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